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1DETECTOR DOGS AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
Richard E. Myers II1
In this Article, Professor Myers argues that an alert, even by a well-trained dog with an 
excellent track record in the field, cannot by itself constitute probable cause to search.  
By using a Bayesian analysis of the value of dog alerts, he demonstrates that additional 
evidence is needed before probable cause exists.   He shows why police won’t make 
changes to their use of dogs without outside prodding, and explores who might do so.  
The article makes some suggestions that, if adopted, will improve the courts’ approach to 
detector dog technologies, allowing them to better strike the balance between the 
competing values of effective law enforcement and personal privacy.  This article uses 
detector dogs as a case study in the difficulty the courts face in reevaluating old 
technology, a problem that brings with it additional layers of complexity, because stare 
decisis and settled expectations limit the courts’ freedom to  make adjustments through 
application of Fourth Amendment principles. 
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2Cry “Havoc,” and let slip the dogs of [the drug] war. 
William Shakespeare, JULIUS CAESAR, Act III, Scene 1.
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As criminals increase their sophistication at disguising drugs, explosives or other 
contraband, law enforcement agencies are deploying modern versions of one of man’s 
oldest search technologies with increasing frequency.  They go by names like Torque,2
and Bobo,3 and Razor, 4 and collectively, these detector dogs and their handlers are 
defining the scope of Fourth Amendment5 rights in searches across the nation.   
Last year, in Illinois v. Caballes6 the Supreme Court determined that detector 
dogs may be used to sniff an otherwise lawfully stopped vehicle, even when the police 
officer handling them lacks reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that 
contraband may be present.  The Caballes opinion halted what appeared to be first steps 
toward finding that the Fourth Amendment required reasonable suspicion before detector 
dogs could be deployed at an automobile stop.   
The Court reached its conclusion in part because it accepted as a legal fact a very 
disputable scientific fact:  that an alert by a properly-trained narcotics detections dog – 
standing alone – constitutes probable cause to believe that a vehicle or bag in fact 
contains narcotics.  By giving its tacit approval to this widely-held presumption, the 
Court missed an opportunity to reexamine the law regarding the value of such an alert, 
 
2 U.S. v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1999) (police canine named Torque). 
3 U.S. v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1997) (police canine named Bobo). 
4 Matheson v. State, 870 So. 2d  8 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 2003) 
5 U.S. CONST. AM. IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
3and has implicitly approved the practice of lower courts in what is in fact a significantly 
underdeveloped area of the law. 
This paper argues that an alert, even by a well-trained dog with an excellent track 
record in the field, cannot by itself constitute probable cause to search.  By using a 
Bayesian analysis7 of the value of dog alerts, this paper demonstrates that additional 
evidence is needed before probable cause exists.   
It then critiques the current practice of the courts through the analysis of a few 
sample cases.  It shows why police won’t make changes to their use of dogs without 
outside prodding, and explores who might do so.  The paper recognizes that systemic 
resistance to the Bayesian analysis will make it very difficult for courts to reevaluate this 
old technology, and explores those barriers.  It then makes some suggestions that, if 
adopted, will improve the courts’ approach to detector dog technologies, allowing them 
to better strike the balance between the competing values of effective law enforcement 
and personal privacy.  Finally, the article focuses on broader principles that we can 
extract from the examination of the way the courts are thinking about detector dogs and 
draws some broader conclusions about search and seizure law. This article uses the 
problems with detector dogs as an entry point for examining the courts’ problems with 
reevaluating the use of established investigative technologies, in part because in a sense 
familiarity breeds contempt, not for the proponents of the familiar evidence but for the 
opponents, and in part because other institutional actors depend on the courts to leave 
 
6 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005). 
7 Bayes theorem is a method used by scientists and doctors to update probabilities in light of new 
information. 
4settled practices in place.8 Other scholars have considered the adoption of new 
technology and how that interacts with the concept of reasonable expectations of 
privacy.9 This article uses detector dogs as a case study in the difficulty the courts face in 
reevaluating old technology, a problem that brings with it additional layers of complexity, 
because stare decisis and settled expectations limit the courts’ freedom to  make 
adjustments through application of Fourth Amendment principles.  
The paper proceeds as follows:  Part II provides some background information 
about the abilities – and limitations – of detector dogs.  Part III examines the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, showing how the Court collapsed the core concern 
of this paper, the value of an alert, into a presumption, ignoring the concerns of the 
dissenters and some lower courts.  This was because the issue was framed as the timing 
of the use of the dog, and not as the value we should ascribe to an alert by that dog once it 
has been used.  (The latter inquiry is the focus of this paper.)  Part IV uses Bayes 
Theorem to demonstrate why the Court was simply wrong to say that an alert by a 
properly-trained dog constitutes probable cause.  Part V examines how the lower courts 
treat dog alerts, and shows that the sate of practice is even worse that the Caballes 
opinion suggests.  Many courts simply assume the conclusion, refusing to even grant 
discovery of the records that would reveal the accuracy of particular dogs, or on the 
conduct of particular searches.  Part VI examines the systemic limitations that make it 
difficult for courts to reevaluate technologies that are already in widespread use, such as 
detector dogs.  Part VII makes suggestions for changes that the courts and/or police 
agencies could implement to improve the use of detector dogs.  Part VII concludes. 
 
8 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
5II. HOW DETECTOR DOGS WORK 
A well-trained, well-handled detection dog can do remarkable things.  We know it 
because of science.  Researchers at Auburn University studying dogs’ capacity to identify 
certain smells have found that some dogs can detect odors when the particles in the air 
are at a concentration of 500 ppt – that’s parts per trillion.10 While there are no good 
studies comparing humans to dogs under similar conditions, dogs react to many smells at 
a threshold well below that of humans.  Properly used, dogs can detect not only narcotics, 
explosives, and accelerants, but land mines, contraband fruit or plants, cadavers, missing 
people, or any one of thousands of scents that a trainer can imagine.11 We know that 
because of history -- any hunter or rancher has heard tales of superb (and highly 
specialized) dogs.  Anyone paying close attention to the news cannot help but be aware of 
the deployment of bomb-sniffing dogs in airports, bus stations, and even the London 
subway system.12 The dog plays a special role in our popular culture -- Lassie’s ability to 
 
9 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
10 J.M. Johnston, Ph.D., Canine Detection Capabilities:  Operational Implications of Recent R&D Findings, 
Institute for Biological Detection Systems, Auburn University, June 1999. 
11 Marc Williams, et al., Canine Substance Detection: Operational Capabilities. Presented at the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy Technology Symposium (1999). Available at 
http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/ibds/pdf/substance_detection.pdf, visited August 1, 2005. United States 
Police Canine Association Certifications are available for narcotics, explosives, accelerants, and cadavers.  
See http://www.uspcak9.com/html/home.shtml  (visited December 19, 2005). Ann Goth, Ian G. McLean 
and James Trevelyan, How Do dogs Detect Landmines?  A Summary of Research Results, in ODOUR 
DETECTION: THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE, 195.  Samuel G. Chapman, POLICE DOGS IN NORTH 
AMERICA (1990) (see particularly pages 64, 70—79, describing narcotics- and explosives-detection dogs 
and noting the possibility of cross training). 
12 See, e.g., Sari Horwitz and Lyndsey Layton, So Far, Dogs Are Still Best Detectors of Bombs, WASH.
POST, July 19, 2005, A17. 
6detect little Timmy in a well is unquestioned.13 Law enforcement uses dogs, and judges 
believe in dogs, because they work.14 
But not all dogs are well-trained and well-handled, nor are all dogs 
temperamentally suited to the demands of being a working dog.15 Some dogs are 
distractible, or suggestible, and may alert improperly. What might lead to such an 
unreliable alert?  The simple fact is that dogs are living, thinking and feeling creatures.  
Because dogs can learn new behaviors, a successful search for a substance on which it 
was not trained – successful because the dog’s handler is now happy – can lead to the dog 
expanding its repertoire, and giving positive alerts on new substances.  Or the dog can 
learn to associate certain smells with the items on which it is trained, for example air 
freshener or plastic baggies, alerting to non-contraband items. Such adaptability is 
natural, and in some contexts highly desirable, but it can lead dogs to do different things 
in the field than they do in the controlled environment of a training facility.16 
Dogs respond by “alerting” to the presence of some chemical molecule that they 
have come to associate with a reward – be it food, or playing with a toy, or praise from 
their handler.  The molecule could be a commonly used mixing chemical, it could be a 
 
13 LASSIE COMES HOME (Warner Home Video 1943); LASSIE THE PAINTED HILLS (Alpha Video 1951); 
COURAGE OF LASSIE (Warner Home Video 1946).  
14 Andrew Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 
HASTINGS L. J. 15-134 (1990).  At least they work most of the time.   See, e.g., U.S. v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 
517 (4th Cir. 1998) (trainer convicted of wire fraud and ordered to pay more than $700,000 in restitution for 
using under-trained dogs and handlers); Trainer gets Prison Term for Defective Bomb-Sniffing Dogs, last 
updated April 28, 2004, visited at  http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1611759&type=story.
15 Kelly J. Garner, et al.. Duty cycle of the detection dog: A baseline study. Final Report. Federal Aviation 
Administration, Washington, DC. (2000). Available at 
http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/ibds/pdf/dutycycle.pdf, visited August 1, 2005. 
16 Well-trained handlers are taught to “proof” the dog through the use of negative training aids.  “The 
handler can then explain that his dog alerts to narcotic odor and only narcotic odor, and that he knows this 
because he has trained around negative training aids such as food items, animal scent, sterile packaging 
materials, etc. and can prove it with documentation.”  Ron Gunton, Documentation and K9 Policing, North 
7trace agent, or it could be the plant itself in the case of marijuana.  The science is not yet 
fully developed, and further experimentation is underway to determine to what the dog 
alerts.17 
Given the level of sensitivity that many dogs possess, it is entirely possible that if 
the person being searched had been at a party where other people were using drugs, then 
the dog would alert because of the residue on clothing or fabric.18 It is possible that in a 
vehicle that had formerly been used to transport drugs, the dog would alert, despite the 
fact that drugs were no longer present -- which might be particularly problematic with 
rental cars.19 Or it is possible that some sort of residue normally associated with drugs 
was present.20 Part of the problem is that the dog can’t tell its handler what it is alerting 
to, and why.  It also lacks a strength meter, or some way of telling its handler how 
confident it is that the scent is strong enough to indicate the actual presence of the 
substance.   
A drug detection dog is not a gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer.  It does not 
detect molecules in the air and produce a readout that states with empirical 
reproducibility the chemical composition of the molecules.  It is part of a team that 
depends on a complex interaction of animal psychology and human factors.21 The dog is 
rewarded for finding drugs.  Many training techniques use a Pavlovian response – the dog 
 
American Police Working Dog Association Website, http://www.napwda.com/tips/index.phtml?id=25,
visited Nov. 5, 2005 (copy on file with author). 
17 J.M. Johnston, Ph.D., Canine Detection Capabilities:  Operational Implications of Recent R&D Findings, 
Institute for Biological Detection Systems, Auburn University, June 1999. 
18 Caballes 543 U.S. at 410, (residual odor theory). 
19 See Jorge G. Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S.-Mexico Border Region:  A Review of Current 
Fifth Circuit Law and a Call for Change, 5 SCHOLAR 227 (2003) (discussing residual odor issues). 
20 Andy G. Rickman, Currency Contamination and Drug-Sniffing Canines:  Should Any Evidentiary Value 
Be Attached to a Dog’s Alert on Cash?, 85 Ky. L.J.. 199,  
21 Lawrence Myers, interview with author. 
8doesn’t eat until it correctly alerts on the presence of drugs.22 This may lead to an 
incentive to alert in cases where there is such a low threshold of detectable molecules that 
there is no probability that contraband is present.  Because the dog sniff includes no 
measure of strength – it’s purely binary, it should be treated with caution. 
Another potential drawback in the use of an animal that hopes to please its 
handler is the problem of handler cuing.  Even the best of dogs, with the best-intentioned 
handler, can respond to subconscious cuing from the handler.  If the handler believes that 
contraband is present, they may unwittingly cue the dog to alert.23 And of course, some 
handlers may consciously be cuing their dog to alert, using the dog to ratify a search they 
already want to conduct. 
III.  ILLINOIS V. CABALLES 
In Illinois v. Caballes,24 the Supreme Court held that when police and their canine 
counterparts arrive at the scene of a traffic stop and circle and sniff a car, even in the 
absence of evidence suggesting that a narcotics search is warranted, that activity is not a 
search that implicates the Fourth Amendment.25 Their decision matched that reached by 
each of the federal circuit courts that had considered the issue.26 In coming to its holding, 
the Court reaffirmed its earlier precedent in United States v. Place,27 which treated “a 
 
22 Lawrence Myers, interview with author 
23 See, e.g., Military Dog Working Program, Department of the Army Pamphlet 190-12, 30 Sept. 1993, at 
24; See Jorge G. Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S.-Mexico Border Region:  A Review of Current 
Fifth Circuit Law and a Call for Change, 5 SCHOLAR 227, 239-40 (2003) (discussing handler cuing). 
24 543 U.S. 405 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005) 
25 Id. at 409-10. 
26 See infra note ___ and accompanying text. 
27 462 U.S. 696 (1983).  See Comment, Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment:  United States v. Place – Dog 
Sniffs – Ten Years Later, 46 Me. L. Rev. 151 (1994). 
9canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as "sui generis"28 because it 
"discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item."”29 
Roy Caballes was stopped for speeding on an Illinois highway.  While he was 
pulled over on the side of the road, enduring the mundane procedures followed whenever 
someone receives a warning ticket, a second trooper arrived in a separate patrol car and 
decided to walk his narcotics detection dog around Mr. Caballes’s car to see if it alerted 
to the presence of drugs.  When it did, the police searched Mr. Caballes trunk and found 
enough marijuana to warrant a 12-year prison sentence and a $256,136 fine.  Caballes 
appealed, arguing that the Fourth Amendment required more than a suspicion of speeding 
before a narcotics detector dog could be deployed.  The Illinois Supreme Court agreed 
with his contention there must be some basis for turning a speeding investigation into a 
narcotics investigation before a drug dog could be deployed.   
 
28 Latin for “of its own kind or class.”  SEE BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (8th Ed. 2004).  The Court’s 
positions on the Fourth Amendment often appear incoherent.  This is at least in part because we are battling 
over property-based and information-based conceptions of the Fourth Amendment.  It is the tension 
between what many scholars see as the prevailing view of the Fourth Amendment set forth in Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and that set forth in more recent cases such as  Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001) .  As Professor Orin Kerr and others have demonstrated, property rights are still, at the 
very least, an excellent starting point for analyzing whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
See   However, there are definite limits to the property arguments.  In Kyllo, a case involving the heat 
signature that could be detected by infrared monitors, without invading any property interests, the court 
held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, notwithstanding significant advances in 
surveillance technology.  Early cases involving the use of microphones to record conversations had focused 
on where the microphone was.  A spike microphone driven through a wall was a clear violation of property 
rights.  A sensitive microphone that heard sound waves that left the defendant’s property was seen as 
raising issues that were different in kind.  As we can see from the examination of the off-the-wall/through-
the-wall arguments in Kyllo over how to delineate the limits for emanations, the Court is still working its 
way through several overlapping views of how the Fourth Amendment is designed to operate.  This may 
suggest that the courts apply an incorrect understanding of "privacy" and wrongly downplay freedom of 
movement? (Cf. Andrew A. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the 21st century: Technology, Privacy, and 
Human Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 125 (2002)). 
What the Court has done in the context of dog sniffs is create a separate category – one it calls sui generis – 
for technologies that detect only contraband. 
29 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. 
10
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.  Caballes was a relatively narrow decision, 
focusing on whether the deployment of the dog constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Specifically, the Court held that conducting a dog sniff would not change a 
traffic stop that was lawful when it began and was otherwise executed in a reasonable 
manner into an unlawful search, unless the manner in which the dog sniff itself was 
conducted infringed the citizen’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy.30 “A dog 
sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other 
than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.”31 Recognize that this reasoning is based on two 
propositions – first, that under these circumstances no search has occurred,32 and second, 
that because this non-search activity only reveals contraband, there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the presence or absence of detectable narcotics (or other 
contraband) molecules.33 
The dissenters would have called the sniff a search, and would have required 
reasonable suspicion before allowing the sniff to take place.34 They lost that argument.  
But that does not mean that they did not have a valid core concern about the way dogs are 
 
30 Id. at 408. 
31 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.   
32 The Court has gone through a convoluted process of determining when Fourth Amendment rights are 
implicated based on the uses of specific technologies.  At one time, under a property-based view of the 
Fourth Amendment, the most important  issue was whether or not there was a physical trespass into the 
property of the accused.  The Fourth Amendment interest was considered coextensive with the defendant’s 
right to exclude.  In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court changed its inquiry to 
an exploration of the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
33 See Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. 1229 (1983).  Professor Loewy argues that where the police can create a “divining rod” that reveals 
only the presence of contraband, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.  “[A]n accurate dog 
approaches the hypothetical divining rod by separating the innocent from the guilty.”  He recognizes the 
limitations that the theory has – a search even by a perfectly accurate dog still exposes one to the indignity 
and possible trauma of being sniffed when the search is of one’s person. 
34 Caballes, 543U.S. at 418-25, Ginsburg, J., dissenting; Id. at 410, Souter, J. dissenting. 
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actually used in the field.  The question presented by the Caballes case was in fact 
incredibly narrow:  Was it a search to bring the dog out and have it sniff?  One can be 
agnostic on the question presented in Caballes – was a sniff a search – and still believe 
that the end result was wrong.    
The Court dismissed the defendant’s contention that error rates and false positives 
may call into question a core premise of the opinion – that the dogs alert only to 
contraband.  The Court has held that the sniff itself does not violate the Constitution.  
This will be true for future cases unless the rule is changed.  However, the subsequent 
search of a trunk – or other private space – is premised on the fact that the dog has alerted 
to the presence of contraband, and the government now possesses probable cause to 
search for it.35 
The dissenters in Caballes were duly concerned with the larger issue -- that these 
dog alerts culminate in searches, and the dissenters’ core concern was right:  A dog alert 
alone should not constitute probable cause to search.36 
Some additional quantum of evidence, probably amounting to reasonable 
suspicion, should be necessary before the search is initiated.37 That additional evidence 
could also be developed after an alert.  It is not when the additional evidence is developed 
 
35 This may be the most fundamental criticism of all.  The statement that an alert by a properly trained dog 
is prima facie evidence of the presence of contraband is based on flawed statistical analysis.  There is 
clearly a problem in setting an appropriate level of background expectation that needs to be addressed.  
Officers clearly can support their instincts with articulable facts.  They do it all the time in the Terry-stop 
context, and it won’t be hard for prosecutors and judges to adapt those requirements to the dog sniff 
context.  While Justices Ginsburg and Souter would require reasonable suspicion before searching, under a 
different rationale, the result may be the right one.  Requiring reasonable suspicion coupled with the dog 
sniff – whether it be before the sniff or after – is a simple and practical safeguard for ensuring the presence 
of probable cause before the search is conducted. 
36 See infra, notes ___ and accompanying text.  
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relative to the dog sniff that is the key to the inquiry; it is the fact that the additional 
evidence must also be developed before a search of the vehicle or bag is initiated, and the 
dog alert and the additional evidence must combine to constitute probable cause. 
For those wondering where the Court’s decision leaves the battle over introducing 
evidence of contraband seized after a narcotics detection dog alerts, nothing significant 
has changed.  The critical issue in the suppression hearings that will continue in trial 
courts will not be whether the mere act of the dog sniffing the car or bag in question is a 
constitutional violation.38 Under Caballes, it clearly is not.39 Instead, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys will be asking a judge to determine two things:  First, was the dog used 
in a place where it had a right to be, during the course of an otherwise lawful stop or 
seizure?40 The second inquiry, and the more critical one, that is left unanswered by 
Caballes was whether this alert, by this dog, under this specific set of circumstances, was 
enough to establish probable cause to search.41 Whether or not the sniff takes place and 
the dog alerts is usually of no great moment to defendants, or to the innocent public who 
are potentially subject to search.42 It is what happens next – the search based on the alert 
 
37 Where I think the dissenters were wrong as a matter of Fourth Amendment principle is that they would 
require that the reasonable suspicion be developed before the dog was allowed to sniff. 
38 This was the focus of the dissent, and has been the focus of the scholarly criticism or support of the 
opinion.  The analysis in those articles focuses on whether or not there was a search, not on whether or not 
the alert constitutes probable cause.  See, e.g., Note, Fidos and Fi-don’ts:  Why the Supreme Court Should 
Have Found a Search in Illinois v. Caballes, 9 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2005); Milton Hirsch and David 
Oscar Markus, Drugs, Dogs and Cars: Oh My!, 29 CHAMPION 48 (2005). 
39 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10. 
40 Id. at 409. 
41 See infra, notes ___ and accompanying text. 
42 At least in terms of collecting evidence.  There may be additional concerns regarding the fear many 
people feel in the presence of search dogs, or the public messages involved in having passers by see the 
police using dogs to sniff around an individual, their vehicle or their possessions. 
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-- that implicates the Fourth Amendment.  The lower courts have often conflated the two 
inquiries,43 and post-Caballes are even more likely to do so.  
IV. DOG SNIFF CASES AFTER CABALLES 
A.  Lawful stop 
 When analyzing detector dog cases post-Caballes, it is important to take the 
inquiries in order:  First, was the dog in a place where it had a right to be, during a lawful 
stop?   Caballes was clear that the rule it stated applies in the event of an otherwise 
lawful stop.  It also assumed that the court would have been warranted in suppressing the 
evidence “if the dog sniff had been conducted while the respondent was being unlawfully 
detained.”44 The range of lawful stops varies from the probable cause traffic stop at issue 
in Caballes to border stops to traffic checkpoints to Terry-style “stop and frisk” scenarios 
based on reasonable suspicion.45 The full range of lawful stop scenarios is beyond the 
scope of this article.  The key issue for the courts is to be sure that whatever the basis, the 
police did not violate the suspect’s rights to put the dog and the items sniffed in the same 
place at the same time  
B.  Probable Cause – quantum or conclusion? 
The second inquiry is whether a search by this dog under these circumstances 
constitutes probable cause to search under the Fourth Amendment.  Just because the sniff 
 
43 See infra, at notes ___ and accompanying text.  So have the commentators.  See supra, note ___. Jorge G. 
Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S.-Mexico Border Region:  A Review of Current Fifth Circuit Law 
and a Call for Change, 5 SCHOLAR 227 (2003); Note, Fidos and Fi-don’ts:  Why the Supreme Court Should 
Have Found a Search in Illinois v. Caballes, 9 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2005);  Comment, Sniffing Out the 
Fourth Amendment:  United States v. Place – Dog Sniffs – Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L. REV. 151 (1994);; 
44 Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408. 
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itself isn’t a violation doesn’t mean that the searches that follow the sniff are legal.  For 
the search to be valid, the search must satisfy the quantum of suspicion appropriate for 
the particular situation and environment.46 Caballes does not suggest that the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement47 lowers the quantum of proof required.  It remains 
probable cause.  Instead, Caballes specifically relied on the trial court’s determination 
that “the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to conduct a full-
blown search of the trunk.”48 
What one thinks about the validity of that conclusion turns in part on what one 
believes the courts should be doing when they interpret the Fourth Amendment’s 
probable cause requirement.  Consider the text of the Fourth Amendment for a moment.   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The probable cause standard actually applies to the issuance of warrants, not to 
warrantless searches.  The people have a right otherwise to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  The courts have read the probable cause requirement 
for warrants back into the term reasonable, holding the probable cause is necessary for 
warrantless searches as well, absent some exigent circumstance.  Some commentators 
 
45 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (police may stop a suspect briefly and frisk him for weapons when 
there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime may be about to occur).  
46 In Illinois v. Gates, the Stated that probable cause deals with probabilities, not certainties.  “Long before 
the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense 
conclusions about human behavior; jurors are permitted to do the same, and so are law enforcement 
officers.  426 U.S. 213, 231-32 (citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).    
47 See U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-09 (1982); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per 
curiam) (ready mobility of vehicle and probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband 
obviated warrant requirement).   
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have suggested that the probable cause requirement has nothing to do with probabilities, 
and is instead the system’s collective shorthand for a search we are willing to permit, i.e. 
searches that are “reasonable.”  Professor Ronald Allen has called this shorthand “local 
knowledge” specific to an area of Fourth Amendment law, and points out that the concept 
of probable cause is in a sense impossible to determine without resort to the surrounding 
circumstances.  Courts search for analogues to see how much evidence, of what kind, was 
found to rise to the level of permitting a search, and call it probable cause. He recognizes 
that there are inherent difficulties in most situations in determining what weight should 
be accorded to particular evidence ex ante. “What specific evidence equates to any 
burden of persuasion cannot be said in advance about any aspect of the human condition. 
… The only method of reducing the analytical indefiniteness of ‘probable cause’ would 
be not to treat it as a probability measure, and instead to generate another type of local 
knowledge.”49 
For example, these commentators suggest that the courts have developed a “local 
knowledge” of reasonable searches during various stages of the vehicle search context.  
The area within the defendant’s reach may be searched for officer safety.  The trunk may 
be searched as part of an inventory search once the vehicle has been seized.  The decided 
cases no longer rely on fresh determinations of the presence of probable cause in each 
new case, but instead are based on what amounts to a common-law police practice code, 
 
48 Caballes 543 U.S. at 409. 
49 See Ronald J. Allen and Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory:  Local 
Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 1149, 1160 (1998).  Professor Albert 
Alschuler has made similar arguments.  See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth 
Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984). 
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which officers can be taught once a particular case is decided.50 If the commentators are 
correct and the Fourth Amendment is all about “local knowledge,” then the Court’s 
determination that a sniff is sufficient to constitute probable cause would be 
determinative under the Fourth Amendment.  
Nevertheless, the courts still seem to be speaking the language of probability 
when they determine whether a search should take place.   So while the facts are 
repeating themselves often enough to lead to well-settled responses, the amount of proof 
remains a constant.  If that is so, then new information about the accuracy of particular 
tests will lead to a reevaluation of the legal conclusion that flows from its presence.  We 
will now explore what that means in the context of a dog sniff. 
V. A BAYESIAN CRITIQUE OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION 
Caballes stands for the proposition that a drug sniff that does not prolong an 
otherwise lawful stop is not a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  It does not 
definitively answer the more fundamental question of whether an alert standing alone 
constitutes probable cause.  As I will demonstrate, under even the most generous 
definition of probable cause, it does not.  
Justice Souter suggested that this might be a potentially fruitful area for further 
development.51 
The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal 
fiction. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get 
into the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed 
 
50 This is particularly important because police in the field need rules of behavior, not abstract legal 
standards.  We will return to this issue below.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
51 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411  (Souter, J. dissenting). 
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infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-
trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect 
accuracy, whether owing to errors by their handlers, the 
limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive 
contamination of currency by cocaine.52 
First, let us consider false positives, highlighted by Justice Souter in his dissent in 
Caballes.53 A false positive is an alert by the dog in the absence of the substance it is 
trained to detect.  False positives are an inherent problem with any less-than-perfect 
system.  It is going to be wrong sometimes, even when the operator is well-trained and 
acting in good faith. This leads to a search of an innocent person – or at least to the search 
of a person who isn’t carrying drugs right now.  In some cases, a false positive leads to a 
search that results in contraband different than the substance the dog is trained to detect; 
for example, a dog trained on cocaine and marijuana may falsely alert, leading to the 
discovery of methamphetamine, cash, or firearms.  False positive alert notwithstanding, if 
the alert is deemed to have constituted probable cause rendering the search legal under 
the Fourth Amendment, any additional contraband or inculpatory materials discovered in 
the course of that search are going to be deemed properly seized under a plain-view 
analysis.54 
But the dissenters missed a more fundamental criticism regarding false positives.  
Even error rates the dissenters would consider perfectly acceptable make it plain that the 
mere fact of an alert cannot be probable cause, once one considers the effect of Bayes’s 
Theorem, a formula commonly used by medical doctors and scientists for taking proper 
 
52 Id. 
53 “The infallible dog … is a creature of legal fiction.  …  In practical terms, the evidence is clear that the 
dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times.”  Caballes 543 U.S. at 411-12 (Souter, J. 
dissenting). 
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account of new information, such as that provided by some type of laboratory test.  It tells 
us, through a little calculation, how strong our belief should be that a particular fact or 
condition exists if we are given a new piece of information to add to what we knew 
before.  Or, in the language of statisticians, what the formula does is allow the user to 
update their beliefs about certain events in light of new information.55 
Applying Bayes’ Theorem debunks the common fallacy that an alert by a dog 
with a 90 percent success rate means there is a 90 percent chance that this particular 
vehicle contains the controlled substance.56 That couldn’t be further from the truth, yet, 
as the literature and the cases confirm, it is a widely held and intuitive misconception.  It 
should not be surprising that unless the dog is perfect, the test only increases the 
likelihood that there are drugs there, it does not establish it.  We don’t expect a 90 percent 
accurate test to leave us with a 100 percent conviction that there are drugs there.  But that 
90 percent accurate test increases the likelihood that drugs are there far less than most 
people think.  If the probability was low to begin with, even a really good test will still 
result in a relatively low number.57 Imagine that there has been a stop by a deputy 
 
54 Under this view, the officer had probable cause to search the place or compartment.  The fact that the 
search revealed different contraband or evidence does not render the evidence inadmissible, because it was 
in plain view from a position where the searching officer had a right to be. 
55 The use of Bayesian analysis in court has been the subject of some controversy, especially where the 
proponent of evidence wants to use Bayes theorem to show that a particular piece of evidence has 
extraordinary probative value.  See Finkelstein and Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification 
Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Broun and Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of 
Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L. REV. 23, Lawrence Tribe, Trial By Mathematics, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).  
For those seeking a more straightforward explanation of Bayes’ theorem and how it works, there is an 
excellent website explaining the application of Bayes Theorem in various contexts which may be helpful 
for the uninitiated. See Eliezer Yudkowsky, An Intuitive Explanation of Bayesian Reasoning:  Bayes' 
Theorem for the curious and bewildered; an excruciatingly gentle introduction, available at 
http://yudkowsky.net/bayes/bayes.html (visited July 12, 2004).   Compare Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order 
Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B. U. L. REV. 673, (1986), passim, (discussing the potential limitations 
on Bayesian Logic in the courtroom). 
56 For an earlier, abbreviated discussion of Bayes theorem in the dog sniff context, see Robert C. Bird, An 
Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405 (1997). 
57 See YUDKOWSKY, supra note 54. 
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sheriff, and while he is writing the driver of the car a ticket, a colleague runs this 90 
percent successful dog around the car.  The handler has not talked to the other deputy at 
all about the stop, the reasons for it, the driver’s demeanor, story, or other conditions.  
The dog alerts at the trunk, scratching vigorously as it has been trained to do in the 
presence of cocaine or marijuana.  Knowing nothing else about the driver and her 
demeanor, what are the odds that the trunk in fact contains an illegal drug?  Despite what 
your instincts may tell you, there is not a 90 percent chance that there will be drugs in the 
car.  It is closer to 16 percent.  Surprised?  Here’s why. 
To see how the error rate of dog alerts alters the probable cause calculation, one 
needs to understand some statistics.  Bayes’ rule provides a framework for this analysis.  
As stated above, Bayes’ rule is concerned with updating of beliefs about certain events in 
light of new information.58 That sounds technical, so consider the following example.  
Suppose the police, because of prior experiences, believe that one out of fifty stopped 
cars will contain drugs.  In other words, the police officer’s original assessment is that 
two percent of the cars stopped will possess drugs.  (Admittedly, one of the problems 
with performing this type of analysis is getting a reliable number for the background 
expectation.  Drug usage surveys may provide some help in establishing a useful figure, 
but there will be considerable disagreement over what figure should be used.  This figure 
is chosen for purposes of illustration only.)   Suppose, then, that the dog alerts after the 
 
58 See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal Identification Evidence:  With 
Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 303, 316-18 (1991), (explaining Bayesian analysis in 
the context of DNA evidence). 
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car is stopped.  The legal question is whether the dog alert alone is enough to justify a 
search.59 
This depends on the dog’s error rate coupled with the officer’s original 
assessment of guilt.  Take first the error rate.  The dog might commit two types of errors.  
First, the dog might fail to alert when there are drugs in the car.  Second, the dog might 
alert when there are no drugs in the car.  Assume that the dog is pretty good.  He fails to 
alert in the presence of drugs only 5 percent of the time. Put another way, he has a 5 
percent false negative rate.  He alerts when drugs aren’t present 10 percent of the time.  
He has a 10 percent false positive rate.    
For our purposes, the important number is the false positives.  What we want to 
know is the probability the car contains drugs conditional on (or in light of) the dog alert.  
Given this information, Bayes rule tells us the chance that the dog alert is correct and the 
person stopped has drugs.  The formula and computation follow:   
First, some notation for the mathematically-inclined.   
Let ]guiltyalertnot[P equal the probability the dog commits the first type of 
error -- 5 percent.  Related, of course, the dog correctly alerts in the presence of drugs 95 
percent of time.  So, 95.][ =guiltyalertP . Let ]innocentalert[P equal the probability 
the dog commits the second type of error -- 10 percent.  Hence, 
90.][ =innocentalertnotP
59 Remember that this depends on the stated premise – that we are talking about the value of the alert 
standing on its own.  If we had more information, we could adjust the prior probability upward or 
downward. 
 
21
Finally, we need the background expectations.  Let 02.][ =guiltyP represent the 
original assessment of guilt and 98.][ =innocentP represent the original assessment of 
innocence. 
 
]innocent[P]innocentalert[P]guilty[P]guiltyalert[P
]guilty[P]guiltyalert[P]alertguilty[P +=
)98)(.10(.)02)(.95(.
)02)(.95(.
+=
=.162393 
 
With a pretty good dog, but a largely innocent population, a dog alert will signal 
drugs only about 16 percent of the time.  The reason is this:  Because the officer is 
stopping mostly innocent people, one has to be more concerned about the false positive 
error (alerting when there aren’t drugs).  Because there are more cars without drugs in 
them, the gross number of searches that result from the error rate will be higher than the 
gross number of searches that result from correct alerts.  Overall, there will be many 
more searches of innocent people than there will be searches of guilty people.60 
Now that we have done the math, the constitutional question that follows is:  Is a 
16 percent likelihood probable cause?  Maybe.  Perhaps counterinuitively, this too 
 
60 Lawyers seem to do particularly poorly with evaluating the value of such a search.  See Michael O. 
Finkelstein and Bruce Levin, On the Probative Value of Evidence From a Screening Search, 43 
JURIMETRICS 265, 268-69. (2003) (“In biomedical applications, the strengths and weaknesses of screening 
tests are well understood.  For example, it is recognized that even very good blood tests for rare conditions 
yield many false positives.  Nevertheless, a similar appreciation has not been evident in the law.”).  See 
also Bird, supra note 55, pp. 427-28 (showing that a 98 percent accurate dog, in a population with a 0.5% 
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requires some thought.  We know from the Court’s decisions that probable cause to 
search does not mean, as any non-lawyer would think, that it is more likely than not that 
there are drugs in the car.  But how much less still qualifies?   The Supreme Court has 
scrupulously avoided answering that question, choosing instead a range of answers – 
leaving the touchstone at some unquantified “fair probability.”61 Is a one in eight chance 
a fair probability?  If a 16 percent chance isn’t good enough, then there isn’t probable 
cause for the search.62 (While some believe the caselaw suggests that a one in three 
chance is probably enough,63 it is likely that one in six is not.) 
 And a search in the absence of probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.64 
Lower court holdings to the contrary notwithstanding, an alert alone should not permit a 
search.  But the courts are permitting searches on alert and nothing more.65 Such, for 
 
drug possession rate, will yield 199 searches of innocent people versus 49 searches of guilty people, in a 
random search of 10,000 people). 
61 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble:  The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 
passim (2004); William J. Stuntz, Commentary:  O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transubstantive 
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001). 
62 Unlike many other instances where probable cause is considered a fluid concept, “turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts – not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a set of 
neat legal rules,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, (1983), some lower courts have been establishing a 
rule for dog cases that the alert of a well-trained dog, standing alone, is enough to constitute probable 
cause.  Because the numbers demonstrate that such an alert is not enough to amount to a “fair probability,” 
the rule has been drawn the wrong way. 
63 The Supreme Court has steadfastly resisted reducing probable cause to percentages.  “The probable 
cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with 
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”  See Maryland v. Pringle, 538 U.S. 921 
(2003).   In Pringle, three men were arrested after police stopped a car in which all three were riding and 
found $763 in cash and several glassine bags of cocaine hidden behind the rear seat armrest.  Under the 
circumstances, the Supreme Court held that there was probable cause to arrest any one or all three of the 
men.  When the front seat passenger, Pringle, confessed to ownership of the drugs, and said that the other 
two men did not know the drugs were there, police released his companions.  Some commentators have 
read Pringle as stating that a one in three chance will be sufficient to constitute probable cause.  Given the 
possibility of joint dominion and control in a common criminal enterprise, the better reading of the opinion 
may be that in the Court’s view under the circumstances there was probable cause to find that the men were 
commonly engaged in selling the drugs, and therefore there was probable cause to arrest any or all of them.  
That belief was reduced as to the other two men when Pringle confessed.  
64 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
65 Courts may not be inclined to be sympathetic to a Bayesian analysis, if they are willing to focus on it and 
can be made to understand it.  See DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN 
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example, was the holding of the lower court in Caballes. “[I]n this case, the trial judge 
found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to conduct a 
full-blown search of the trunk.”66 
The fact that the alert alone should not constitute probable cause does not mean 
that the dog’s alert is not a critical piece of evidence that can be combined with other 
evidence to constitute probable cause.  Suppose instead that the dog is deployed when the 
police officer has a suspicion, based on other factors, that suggests that there may be 
narcotics present.  If he has a pretty good nose for narcotics dealers  of his own, then 
other studies on hit rates of police officers conducting searches based on factors that 
otherwise have been held to constitute probable cause suggest he may have a 30 percent 
chance of being right.67 In that case, the prior probability that the car contains drugs will 
significantly increase the importance of the detector dog’s alert.  Under those conditions, 
the Bayesian calculation, with a 30 percent prior probability and a 90 percent accurate 
dog, would result in a 79 percent chance that there are drugs in the car – clearly probable 
cause. 
 Perhaps this analysis explains why a reasonable justice might believe that there 
should be reasonable suspicion before the dog is deployed.  This was certainly the 
position of the Caballes dissenters.68 This requirement would make sense in light of the 
Bayesian analysis, because the objective, articulable facts that would lead a well-trained 
 
LITIGATION, at 498.  (“The lawyer who is about to offer statistical proof should begin with two sobering 
assumptions.  These are (1) that the trier of fact will rarely have any knowledge of statistical techniques and 
(2) that the trier of fact will probably be unsympathetic to the general concept of statistical proof.”) 
66 Caballes, 547 U.S. at 409. 
67 See Bird, supra note 55, at 429-431; John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor 
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, CARESS WORKING PAPER 99-06 (1999) at 10, available at 
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/Centers/CARESS/CARESSpdf/99-06.pdf .
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officer to have that reasonable suspicion, coupled with an alert, would constitute probable 
cause.  However, the reasonable suspicion need not come before the dog is deployed to 
meet the constitutional concerns.  It is also possible, and in some instances perhaps 
preferable, to permit the deployment of the dog, but to require some additional articulated 
basis amounting to reasonable suspicion before deciding that under the totality of the 
circumstances, there is indeed a “fair probability” that there are drugs in the car. 69 
None of this is to suggest that the use of a well-trained narcotics dog (or 
explosives dog or cadaver dog) in conjunction with other good police practices should 
not result in a finding of probable cause.  A dog with a decent accuracy rate is a tool 
much like a test for cancer.  It may not be enough to warrant beginning a course of 
treatment, but it certainly warrants further investigation, including more painful and 
intrusive tests. 
Before we can determine that the level of proof has risen to whatever quantum the 
courts deem sufficient to constitute probable cause, it stands to reason that the dog must 
be reliable.   Indeed, the foregoing analysis was based on the belief that the dog in 
question was 90 percent accurate in the field.  That is a very accurate dog.  Unlike a 
scientific test for cancer, the reliability of detector dogs can vary widely from individual 
to individual.  Change the presumptions about error rates, and the ultimate reliability 
figure will change.  If the dog that is actually used is not very good, then the number of 
searches of innocent people will rise.   
 
68 See 543 U.S. 405, 410-417, (Souter, J. dissenting), 543 U.S. 405, 417-425. (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
69 In other contexts, we might want to fall back on the special needs doctrine to deem reasonable searches 
conducted on less than probable cause.  For example, we want to be able to deploy bomb-sniffing dogs in 
airports or on subways when there is a heightened terrorism threat. 
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VI. WHAT THE COURTS ARE DOING 
The systemic flaw that the Bayesian analysis reveals is compounded by the 
cavalier attitude many judges take to the value of a dog sniff.  In many courtrooms, an 
alert by a trained detector dog, standing alone, constitutes sufficient probable cause to 
search. Courts in each of the federal circuits have reached this conclusion.70 According 
to such courts, “[a] dog’s positive indication alone is enough to establish probable cause 
for the presence of a controlled substance if the dog is reliable.  To establish the dog’s 
reliability, the affidavit need only state the dog has been trained and certified to detect 
drugs.”71 This approach is wrong both as a matter of science72 and as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment law.73 
70 See, e.g., U.S. v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873 (8th Cir, 1999) (collecting cases). The leading case for this view 
is United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, (5th Cir. 1995).  See also, by circuit, U.S. v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 
749-50, (1st Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963, 966, (1st Cir., 1976); U.S. v. Race, 529 F.2d 12,14 (1st 
Cir. 1976; U.S. v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 21, 22-23, (2d Cir. 
1981);  U.S. v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994); 
U.S. v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 704 (5th Cir. 2003), U.S. 
v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 151, n.7 (5th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. 
Dovali-Avila, 895 F.2d 206, 207-208 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153-154 (6th Cir. 1996); 
U.S. v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. 
Delaney, 52 F.3d 182, 188-189, (8th Cir. 1995);  U.S. v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir. (1991); U.S. v. 
Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir. (1993)’ U.S. v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983);   
71 Id. at 876. 1976); U.S. v. Shayesteh, 166 F.3d 349 (10th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Kennedy 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 
(10th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1527-1528, (10th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 
1491 (10th Cir. 1993; U.S. v. Gonzalez-Acosta, 9898 F.2d 384, 388-389 (10th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Venema,
563 F.2d 1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 402 (11th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Sentovich,
677 F.2d 834, 838, n. 8, 11th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Unrue,
47 C.M.R. 56, 558, 560, (U.S.C.M.A. 1973); U.S. v. Thomas, 50 C.M.R. 114, 116-117 (U.S.N. 1975). 
72 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
73 The courts have an independent duty to determine whether there was probable cause based on the 
particular circumstances of the case.  See Ornelas v. United States, 517  U.S. 690, 695 (1996).  It is a two-
step inquiry.  The court must determine what in fact happened, then determine whether from the standpoint 
of a reasonable police officer, the facts constituted probable cause. But it is important to note that in 
Ornelas, the Court distinguished cases there was a warrant, which led to a deferential standard on review, 
from cases where there is no warrant and the appellate courts review the existence of probable cause de 
novo. Searches following dog alerts often take place in the absence of a warrant.  See Jorge G. 
Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S.-Mexico Border Region:  A Review of Current Fifth Circuit Law 
and a Call for Change, 5 SCHOLAR 227 (2003) 
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Nevertheless, in many, and perhaps most, cases, even when the search following 
the alert proceeds without a warrant, judges have simply asked if the dog was certified, 
and ended the inquiry, refusing even to permit further discovery by the defendant into the 
particular dog and handler’s training record or track record in the field.74 This court-
imposed limitation on questioning is wrongheaded.  The simple fact of the matter is that 
some dogs, like some witnesses, are unreliable.75 And some handlers, like some experts, 
are unreliable.76 Refusing to grant the defendant discovery of information that can be 
used to impeach the credibility of the dog or its handler violates the core principles of 
Brady v. Maryland,77 as well as Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure78 and 
many state analogues. The Ninth Circuit, for example, reached this position in United 
States v. Cedano-Arellano.79 There the Ninth Circuit held that training and certification 
records were “crucial to [the defendant’s] ability to assess the dog's reliability, a very 
important issue in his defense, and to conduct an effective cross-examination of the dog's 
handler.”80 Other courts in the Sixth,81 Seventh,82 Ninth83 and Tenth84 Circuits have 
 
74 See State v. Nguyen, et al., 811 N.E.2d 1180, 157 Ohio App.3d 482 (2004) (collecting cases). 
75 Interview with Lawrence Myers; Bird, handler cuing 
76 BIRD, supra note 55, 420-23 (handler cuing); See Andrew Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The 
Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 15-134 (1990). 
77 373 U.S. 83, (1963).  Brady requires that the government disclose any potentially exculpatory evidence 
to the defendant in advance of trial.  Evidence that might be relevant to the existence or absence of 
probable cause has been deemed to be Brady material.  See _______. 
78 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C): DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE OBJECTS. Upon request of the defendant the 
government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, 
tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control 
of the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense or are intended for use by the 
government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant. 
79 332 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2003). 
80 Id. at 571. 
81 U.S. v. Littleton, 15 Fed,. Appx. 189, 192-193 (6th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Hill, 195 F. 3d 258, 273-274 (6th 
Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 393-396 (6th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. $67,220.00 in U.S. Currency, 957 
F.2d 280, 285-286, (6th Cir. 1992).  
82 U.S. v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 707-798 (7th Cir. 2001). 
83 U.S. v. Spetz, 721 F. 2d 1457, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983). 
84 U.S. v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1527-1528, (10th Cir. 1993). 
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reached similar conclusions.  Courts that permit such discovery recognize that there may 
be differences between a team’s performance in controlled conditions and in the field, 
and will permit the discovery of records that may document those differences.   
If the dog is unreliable, what problems can we expect those records to reveal?  
The experts point to three: general false positives, handler cuing, and poorly performing 
teams.  We have already considered the false positives problem.  Before we get to the 
problems of handler cuing and poorly-performing teams, we need to spend a little bit of 
time on how scenting dogs work.  Given the fact that dogs remain crucial participants in 
cases defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment, it is critical that the courts improve 
their understanding of the pluses and minuses of using them.85 
A. Bad dog, “good” search  
In practice, how accurate have the courts required a dog to be to establish 
probable cause to search?  Depending on the courtroom, not very.86 Even a cursory 
review of the caselaw demonstrates that for defense attorneys, the cases are not great.  
Consider Torque, the canine at issue in United States v. Owens.87 Torque was hardly the 
best in the business.  He had flunked drug dog school not once, but twice.88 In the two 
years prior to the search at issue, according to the defendant’s briefs, he had a less than 
50 percent hit rate in automobile searches where he alerted.89 That means that police 
 
85 Of the existing literature on this topic, the two seminal articles are Andrew Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose 
Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 15-134 (1990), and  Robert C. 
Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405 
(1997).  See also Comment, Common Scents: Establishing a Presumption of Reliability for Detector Dog 
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actually found drugs in the vehicle in fewer than half of the cases where Torque indicated 
that drugs would be there.  A defense expert in animal behavior and detection dog 
training, one who had previously worked for the government in various capacities, 
testified that in his opinion the dog was unreliable in the field, based on the objective 
evidence presented.90 The defense relied on information that showed that in 1994, 50 
percent of the searches in which Torque alerted yielded drugs or money, and that in 1995, 
only 40 percent of such searches did.91 
In response to this attack on Torque’s reliability, the government witness 
suggested his own math.  He used any failure to alert as a true negative, and bootstrapped 
that information into the prosecution’s statistical analysis as evidence of Torque’s success 
rate.92 (Given that there is no way to tell if a negative result is correct, those numbers 
should be considered irrelevant in evaluating the dog’s accuracy.) 
Torque’s handler and his trainer testified that in their opinion, Torque was “an 
extremely reliable dog.”93 They defended his failure to find narcotics on a “residual 
odor” theory, arguing that Torque was not wrong, but was instead reacting to the 
presence of trace amounts of drugs that were still present.94 As the head of the Sheriff’s 
Departments detector dog unit testified,  “I think you have to take into consideration 
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when you have a nonproductive search on a drug dealer’s vehicle that there’s a good 
chance there’s been some type of narcotics in that vehicle.”95 
The Court found Torque reliable, and admitted the evidence.96 If an alert by 
Torque can be the basis for probable cause, then it’s going to require an extraordinarily 
bad dog before a defense expert can successfully impeach the government’s “expert.”  
But there may well be more to the story.  The training officer may have a point.  It 
is true that correct alerts may fail to yield drugs or explosives.  The dog’s nose is 
incredibly sensitive.  Remember that testing by experts at Auburn University has shown 
that some trained dogs can detect concentrations of scent molecules in the air at 
concentrations as low as 500 parts per trillion.97 Return for a moment to the search in 
Owens. Torque was used primarily by his department in responding to search warrants, 
where the police already had information that the person being searched was involved in 
drug activity.  His handler expected to find drugs.  When he alerted, but no drugs were 
found, it is indeed possible that he was responding as he had been trained to do, but he 
was alerting to trace amounts of the substance.  The problem is that there was no 
objective evidence on which to base that conclusion. 
Perversely, the better the dog is at detecting trace amounts of the desired 
substance, the higher the likelihood that the dog will alert on trace amounts that are 
inadvertently present in materials owned by the innocent.  For example, this risk was the 
basis for the dissenters’ in Caballes discussing the possibility that the money supply in 
 
95 Appellee brief at p. 37 Note that this cuts both ways.  A dog that alerts regularly to residual odors is 
actually less reliable at discerning whether drugs are actually present.  This is the functional equivalent of 
staleness in the warrant application process. 
96 Owens at 749-50. 
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the United States is generally contaminated with cocaine, and dogs detecting these trace 
amounts of contraband may lead to numerous constitutionally-impermissible searches as 
a result of alerts by sensitive canines.98 
B.  Handler cuing (Good dog, bad Handler?) 
A handler may cue his dog to alert, leading to a search based not on the dog’s 
response to the presence of contraband, but on its response to the handler’s emotions.  
Consider South Dakota v. Lockstedt,99 which demonstrates these dangers in detail.  The 
case involved two state troopers, two narcotics detector dogs, and three passes around the 
vehicle.  This narcotics case arose, as many do, out of a lawful traffic stop.100 While one 
state trooper, Trooper Swets, took his time writing a ticket for speeding, his colleague, 
Trooper Oxner, walked his dog, Jake, around the car, sniffing for drugs.101 In a full 
circuit of the vehicle, Jake failed to alert at all.102 
Trooper Swets, who was writing the ticket, noticed that the driver of the car, who 
was sitting in the patrol car, was becoming increasingly nervous as he watched Jake 
circle the car.103 Based on this observation, he uncrated his own dog, Crockett, and had 
him circle the car. Crockett was trained to alert aggressively – that is, he was supposed to 
scratch at the vehicle if he smelled drugs.104 On the first pass, Crockett did not alert at 
all.  Unsatisfied with this response, Trooper Swets had him circle the car again.  This 
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time, the dog stopped and took a longer sniff at the door seams, where odors could be 
expected to be coming from inside the vehicle.  He still failed to alert as trained.  
However, his handler encouraged him, telling him “I saw that.” 105 Then the Trooper 
walked the dog to the trunk, where he had failed to alert, previously, and ordered him up 
on the trunk.106 Finally, Crockett alerted.  And it turned out that there were drugs in the 
car.  According to the defense’s expert, the stops at the door seams, where the dog failed 
to alert, were equally consistent with some other odor catching the dog’s interest, because 
Crockett did not alert as he was trained to do.107 The government’s expert, who was 
responsible for training in the state, also testified that he would not consider the dog’s 
behavior, which he reviewed on videotape from the patrol cars’ cameras, sufficient 
indication that a search was warranted.108 The lower court found in the government’s 
favor, on the basis of the Trooper’s testimony, in which he equivocally suggested that the 
dog’s behavior had changed significantly as he aged, so this behavior was now an 
indication that drugs might be present.109 
Defense counsel was refused a discovery request when Lockstedt sought the 
dog’s service records, which would have shown how often the dog alerted, and how often 
those alerts resulted in false positives.110 The narcotics evidence came in, and Lockstedt 
was convicted.  One need not impute bad motives to the police officer to see that there is 
a complex interaction here.  The distinction between reliable and unreliable alerts may 
depend on the seat in which one sits. 
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In contrast, in United States v. Heir,111 the court suppressed evidence found when 
the dog “alerted” to the presence of drugs by sniffing more intensely around certain parts 
of the vehicle.  Robbie, the canine in question, had been trained to aggressively alert by 
pawing or scratching at the car.  His handler acknowledged that the behavior he deemed 
an alert “was subtle, and might only be recognized by himself or another person who was 
familiar with Robbie’s tendencies.”112 Defense experts saw no evidence of an alert on 
the videotape, and pointed out actions that might have amounted to cuing by the 
handler.113 The court found that “there must be an objectively observable ‘indication’ by 
the dog of the presence of drugs” and suppressed the evidence, declining to address other 
concerns about the dog’s accuracy.114 
The foregoing cases highlight two concerns, one operational and one evidentiary.  
If dogs can alert in response to handler cuing, conscious or subconscious, how can we tell 
if in this particular case the dog is responding to the odor of drugs or explosives, or to his 
handler’s belief that under these circumstances, this person probably has drugs? As a 
substantive matter, we want training methods that will yield accurate results. Therefore, 
we must initiate processes that will ensure that result.115 
Second, if the dog can function two ways, as a drug or explosives detector, or as 
a handler-hunch detector, both yielding the same behavior, and the dog itself can’t be 
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cross-examined to ask it which, how can the courts test whether this particular dog and 
handler combination is yielding accurate results?  The only way for a court to tell is for 
law enforcement agencies to be required to scrupulously maintain records showing how 
often the dog alerts, under what circumstances, and to make that information available to 
judges when they are determining if this event constitutes probable cause.  If the records 
were kept, they would give us insights into whether the dogs operating in the real world 
have or reflect handler biases along any number of dimensions. 
C. A few dissenting state voices 
The Court’s decision in Caballes came in the face of a few scattered opinions in 
the state courts that would require reasonable suspicion before a dog was deployed.  The 
Illinois Supreme Court, had counterparts in North Carolina116 and Minnesota.117 
In some instances, state courts are taking different approaches to the problem.  For 
instance, Minnesota, in State v. Carter,118 rejected the analysis of Caballes altogether in 
analogous circumstances, and held that “the sniff of a drug-detection dog outside 
appellant’s storage unit was a search for purposes of the Minnesota Constitution.”119 
Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted Justice Ginsburg’s caveat, and 
decided to specifically limit its decision to drug-detection dogs.  “We express no opinion 
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regarding bomb-detection dogs, as to which the needs of law enforcement might well be 
significantly greater.” 
 Defendants might find some hope in Matheson v. State,120 a case involving Razor, 
a narcotics detection dog who alerted to the presence of methamphetamine. Razor was 
not certified for meth, although he had received departmental training on the drug.  Razor 
did not alert the first time he circled Matheson’s car, but after his handler took him 
around again, pausing at the door seams, Razor did alert.  Officers searched the car and 
found drug paraphernalia, including syringes and spoons, as well as hydrocodone, tablets, 
morphine tablets, and methamphetamine. 
 At the subsequent suppression hearing, the prosecution deliberately did not 
present evidence of Razor’s performance in the field. From the stand, Razor’s trainer 
suggested that data from the field was useless, because the dog could be alerting correctly 
on dead scents, and it would be impossible to assess the dog’s reliability under field 
conditions.   
Florida’s Second District Court of Appeals was unimpressed by this line of 
reasoning.  The court noted that the state had the burden to show that there was probable 
cause for the warrantless search.  
Given the “language barrier” between humans and 
canines–thus, for example, preventing the officer from 
questioning the dog further for corroborative details, as he 
might a human informant–the most telling indicator of what 
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the dog's behavior means is the dog’s past performance in 
the field. Here, the State did not present any evidence of 
Razor's track record. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
State did not meet its burden to establish that the deputies 
had probable cause to search Matheson's car. 121 
The Florida Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case, and questioning 
focused on the recordkeeping issue.  Ultimately the Supreme Court dismissed the case 
without an opinion, leaving the appellate ruling intact.  Florida attorneys, it appears, may 
be able to argue for suppression in the absence of such records. 
VII. REEVALUATING OLD TECHNOLOGY 
A. Divergence of Interests 
Different institutional actors will have different responses to the problems these 
cases present.  There are perverse investment incentives and a collective action problem 
when it comes to training and evaluating detector dogs, just as there are in many other 
areas of Fourth Amendment law.122 The government has a diffuse interest in protecting 
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privacy – and in some cases no interest whatsoever – and the innocent parties being 
searched are disorganized and only minimally invested in preventing future searches.123 
The guaranteed repeat players, law enforcement officials, have a pressing interest in 
searching as many vehicles or other private spaces as they think may yield some 
incriminating information,124 and it is the law enforcement officials who identify and 
compensate the vendors who train and certify police dogs.125 Under the most cynical 
view of the issue, the incentive for law enforcement is to get the most hypersensitive dog 
that passes constitutional muster.  A dog that reliably responds to the presence of drugs, 
and is sensitive to handler cuing as well, will endorse the most searches possible.  Under 
this view, the cost of incorrect alerts in time and effort is low in the context of street-
encounter law enforcement searches, where the officer has other suspicions that led her to 
call for the dog in the first instance.  This misalignment of interests may lead the police to 
choose the certifying agency with the loosest standards, because dogs trained to the 
loosest standards will permit the most searches.  And such an approach will create 
significant competition between the certifying agencies to provide the training methods 
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Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 ILL. L. REV. 600, 605-09.   
124 The rewards are often financial as well as intangible.  Officers are rewarded for making good busts, 
departments report amounts of drugs seized to the city councils or legislatures that fund tem, cash or 
property seized along with the drugs is often rolled back into law enforcement, many departments keep 
seized drug vehicles for use by undercover officers, or assign them to officers as department vehicles.  
125 Public choice theory suggests that small well-organized groups can capture the legislative process 
through rent-seeking.  See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS, 53-65 (1965); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 Const. 
Comment. 279, 289,.  See also Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign Immunity,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1436 (2003) (“If public law is a product of technical expertise and bureaucratic 
professionalism, it is also shaped by the conflict of competing interests.  This conflict is resolved partly 
according to the ideological preferences of the lawmakers themselves and partly according to the political 
power of the various interests.”). 
37
and certifications that most closely comport with the interests of the people writing the 
checks.126 
But there is not always a mismatch between the incentives for law enforcement 
and the public’s privacy interests. When Transportation Safety Authority officials use 
dogs to screen bags for explosives at the airport, or USDA officials use them to screen 
containers for contraband fruit, their incentives are to use the most accurate dogs 
consistent with the mission because there are limited resources and a high volume of 
materials to be searched.   The airlines and shippers also provide the organized and 
interested deep pockets that will stand in as proxies for the public, solving the collective 
action problem. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the divergence of interests in these different 
contexts, in practice there are many competing standards.  Some are set by the individual 
states, some by private groups such as the United States Police Canine Association, some 
by federal agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement or the Border Patrol, 
and there is a separate set of standards for the military.  There is very little oversight of 
what it means to be certified.  Given the diffuse nature of law enforcement in the United 
States and the realities of mixed standards in a federal system, enforcing some minimum 
through the Fourth Amendment will prove incredibly difficult.  Nevertheless, one method 
of evaluating standards worth considering is comparing the accuracy standards and 
training methods used where the interests of the public and law enforcement are more 
closely aligned with those used in contexts where one expects a broader divergence.  
 
126 There can be significant competition for the training contract.  Some examples of the competing 
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B. Practical Limitations 
And there may be some practical limitations as well.  Even if we really want 
accurate dogs, there may not be enough of them to go around.  Given the increase in 
demand for detection dogs post-9/11, there are also significant financial incentives for 
trainers and certifying agencies to deploy dogs of marginal talent.127 
There are additional problems in the Fourth Amendment context regarding the 
reevaluation of an established technology such as detection dogs.   The courts set 
standards for law enforcement conduct through the caselaw, and the police adopt 
procedures and train their officers to meet those standards.128 We are a long way from 
fundamental reform of the warrant process, and courts and police are eager to get on with 
the business of searching vehicles.  In the wake of terror attacks that have intensified 
existing concerns and have led to an increased demand for tools that will help us find 
certain forms of contraband, it does not strain credulity to predict new caselaw that will 
loosen, not tighten, standards for admitting evidence.  But all of us, the police, the public, 
and those who work in the administration of justice, have a Fourth Amendment-mandated 
interest in making sure that the dogs are accurate, and that searches based on their alerts 
are justified.129 
certifying or training groups include the National Narcotic Detector Dog Association, Eastern States 
Working Dog Association, International Police Working Dog Association, Virginia Police Work Dog 
Association, Tarheel Training, Inc. 
127 This shortage has led to overreaching in some cases. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 
1998) (trainer convicted of wire fraud and ordered to pay more than $700,000 in restitution for using under-
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39
C. The conservatism of the courts 
Will the foregoing arguments lead the courts to reevaluate the use of detector 
dogs?  I think it is unlikely.  This is due at least in part to the court’s inherent 
conservatism when reevaluating any established technology.  A combination of factors is 
at play here.   
A reexamination of the canine sniff technology implicates concerns extensively 
covered by an earlier generation of scholars such as Wayne LaFave,130 and Anthony 
Amsterdam131 -- the interrelationship between the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
precedent, police practices based on these settled expectations, and reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  Now that the Fourth Amendment has been applied to the states, 
police nationwide depend on the courts’ interpretations to determine how to train their 
officers on acceptable search and seizure practices.  The courts’ opinions also inform the 
public’s expectations of privacy.  A new generation of scholars such as William 
Stuntz,132 Orin Kerr,133 Daniel Solove,134 and Christopher Slobogin135 is at work on 
developing theories that will help us understand the institutional limitations on courts, 
legislatures and administrative agencies, the structures in place to determine how best to 
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incorporate new technology into police practice, while still respecting reasonable 
expectations of privacy.136 
Courts have an inherent conservatism in the Fourth Amendment arena.  The 
courts set standards for law enforcement conduct through the caselaw, and the police 
adopt procedures and train their officers to meet those standards.137 The sorts of 
limitations on privacy that society is willing to deem reasonable are part of a feedback 
loop between the courts, the public, and the police.  Once matters are decided as a matter 
of Fourth Amendment law, it is not surprising that the system needs and encourages 
stability, given the various educative functions to be fulfilled.  The systemic desire for 
stability in settled expectations makes it particularly difficult for courts to employ new 
research into the efficacy of old technologies.   
On the frontiers, we expect new technologies to change settled expectations of 
privacy.  Techniques such as thermal imaging, portable gas chromatography/mass 
spectroscopy analyzers, and devices for detecting explosives molecules can all bring to 
light things that were formerly unknown and unknowable. 138 Professors Kerr and Solove 
are in the midst of a fresh debate in the literature over the efficacy and strengths of 
legislative or judicial attention to new technology.139 We would expect the process to be 
interested in updating the rules as new information is gathered.  New technologies also 
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have the benefit of legislative attention.  Courts are thinking about them afresh.   There 
are incentives to gather data on both sides of the issue, with groups interested in 
protecting privacy interests as engaged as the government. 
But old technologies suffer from both a legal stickiness problem, and a legislative 
inattention problem.  The legal stickiness problem is a result both of the need for stability 
addressed earlier, and of the courts’ desire to avoid thinking about complex scientific 
issues if it can trot out the rubric “The use of [insert technology here] is well-settled in 
the law of this [state/circuit] and we need not revisit it here.”  Judges prefer to do what 
they do best – construe the law, so this should come as no surprise.  Legislatures are 
likewise unlikely to pay attention to old technologies, unless an egregious misuse brings 
it to the attention of a sponsor, who will take the time and energy to draft legislation.  
Because of the diffusion of interest in privacy, and the widely-held public belief that the 
courts unnecessarily coddle criminals already, there is often little benefit to offset the 
legislator’s cost in time and energy. 
At trial, new scientific advances in our understanding of old technology can bring 
into question the reliability of techniques previously thought well-settled, implicating the 
courts’ gatekeeper role under Daubert.140 The court has an independent duty to evaluate 
the reliability of scientific evidence in the first instance.  The court is supposed to 
consider the views of the experts in the field, arrive at some independent evaluation of 
new advances in scientific understanding, and apply its critical faculties to the issue of 
admissibility.  This is a role that many courts find difficult, and unpleasant.  Perhaps we 
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should not be surprised that many judges fall back on their own specialized training, and 
use precedent as an evaluative tool, accepting the conclusions of their predecessors rather 
than engaging in a fresh reevaluation of particular technologies.141 In suppression 
hearings, courts don’t have the Daubert admissibility issues to contend with, because the 
judge rather than the jury is the factfinder, and the risk of jurors being misled by experts 
is obviated.  However, the court as factfinder has an independent duty to evaluate the 
strength of the evidence, and deciding as a matter of law that particular kinds of evidence 
are deemed reliable seems a dereliction of that duty. 
These limitations on the courts desire and ability to adapt to changed 
understandings of old technologies, especially in the suppression hearing context, 
intersect with the courts’ role as drafters and enforcers of a police code of conduct, 
further limiting their willingness and ability to change.  Even courts that might be 
skeptical about a particular technology would face the prospect of massively upsetting the 
system if they were to find a widely deployed and previously accepted technology 
unreliable.  The police are invested in the courts’ stated positions, leading to a deep 
conservatism with regard to old technology. The courts are not that inclined to update 
their thinking, in large part because of these institutional limitations.142 
140 See articles on rethinking fingerprints, DNA, blood typing, footprints.
141 There are significant costs involved in constantly reevaluating established technologies.  If each court 
had to consider the scientific bases for the admissibility of fingerprint evidence or DNA evidence, trials 
would be significantly longer and more costly than they already are. 
142 See Peter Donnelly and Richard D. Friedman.  DNA Database Searches and the Legal Consumption of 
Forensic Evidence., 97 MICH L. REV. 931, 976 (1998)(criticizing the courts for being slow to update their 
understanding of forensic evidence. “The law should not be a passive consumer of scientifically-based 
information, taking what scientists have to offer ‘off the rack.’  Rather, it should be an aggressive 
consumer, asking its suppliers to supply what it needs.”) 
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An additional hurdle to unleashing the courts on the inquiry into the dog’s 
accuracy is the nature of the remedy.143 In almost all of the cases that result in an 
opinion, the search revealed some evidence of crime that the defendant is trying to 
suppress.  There will be a strong and understandable urge on the part of many judges to 
find the dog reliable, if the alternative is excluding unmistakable evidence of the crime.  
As one trial judge put it, while pointing to the evidence the defendant was seeking to 
suppress, “I’m a practical man. The dog is accurate – the proof is right there.”   
Focusing the effort to manage the use of detector dogs at the trial court level will 
lead to undesirable results under the exclusionary rule – guilty people will go free – and 
also leaves the innocent with no remedy for potential violations of their rights.  By the 
time the exclusionary rule is applied, the rights are long-since violated.  As Caballes’s 
attorneys noted in their Supreme Court petition, the exclusionary rule is only helpful in 
those cases where the alert did in fact result in a successful search144 – and qualified 
immunity leaves the innocent who were unsuccessfully searched without a remedy.  
Because those innocent voices are largely excluded from the process, we don’t know if 
the officers in the foregoing cases were really exercising solid instincts, which they well 
might have been, or if there is more to the story. 
D. Updating the Courts’ Thinking About Dog Sniffs 
Dog sniff technology is clearly an old technology – it dates back to prehistory, 
when ancient man took advantage of the domesticated dog’s ability to seek out prey for 
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their mutual benefit.145 But the modern uses of dogs in police cases call for some 
updated thinking about the value of a dog’s alert when privacy interests are being 
subordinated as a result.  Fourth Amendment rules are supposed to be clear and readily 
applied.  The best reason for permitting searches based on an alert by a trained and 
certified dog is ease of administration.  The only things the police officer in the field has 
to know before commencing her search is that the dog is trained, and certified, and the 
dog alerted.  End of internal inquiry, on with the search.  But is ease of administration 
enough to overcome any constitutional concerns?   The very existence of the Fourth 
Amendment, and the oft-cumbersome warrant process, mandates otherwise. 
 Desires for simplicity notwithstanding, adding a requirement that the officer 
show reasonable suspicion in addition to the dog alert, as the Caballes dissenters 
suggested would not pose a significant new burden.  Every officer is trained to deal with 
the reasonable suspicion standard when it comes to traditional Terry stops, so training 
them to meet that requirement in dog search cases is not an insurmountable obstacle.146 
VIII. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE  
A. Collect Data 
It is hard to get people to reassess things they believe they already understand.  
Given that difficulty, I would propose some measures that would give the courts 
something concrete to work with, should they choose to embark on the process:  
 
145 Andrew Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 
HASTINGS L. J. 15-134 (1990). 
146 Of course the safest solution for much of this is simply to allow the officer to detain the vehicle for a 
reasonable time, go before a magistrate in person or telephonically, explain the circumstances, and get a 
45
mandatory data collection on dog deployments, including the use of videotape where 
feasible, and standardized training, around requirements set where the state’s interest in 
accuracy is highest.  Additionally, I would propose, where there is the political will to do 
so, addressing these issues not only in the courts, where the exclusionary rule may warp 
views of the stakes, but also in the legislature and administrative agencies, such as police 
commissions or other groups responsible for setting police training standards.  Let us 
consider these proposals in turn.  
At the very least, the courts should mandate the collection of data on the use of 
the dogs, and their accuracy rates in the field.  If the dog is wildly inaccurate in the field, 
it can’t be the basis for probable cause.  Because the government is the one relying on the 
dog to override the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and because it is in the position 
to easily collect the data, it should be required to do so.  It has the burden of proof, and 
the courts are perfectly within their power to require it to demonstrate accuracy in the 
field.  The United States Army already mandates the collection of such data, with good 
results.147 The information we should be collecting would include the time, date and 
place of the search, weather conditions, the characteristics of the driver, the physical 
characteristics of the place or vehicle searched.  It should also include whether the search 
yielded anything.  Remember, the issue is whether under the totality of the circumstances, 
when considered in conjunction with this particular dog’s behavior under these 
 
warrant.  Granted, that can be cumbersome and costly, but the innocent individual can choose to waive his 
rights, grant permission to search, and be on her way. 
147 See Department of the Army, Pamphlet 190-12, Military Working Dog Program (1993). 
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conditions, there was sufficient objectively verifiable evidence that probable cause 
existed to search this particular vehicle. 148 
The oversight agencies should mandate improved training, and fail to recognize 
certifications by agencies that fail to meet the highest standards.  Critical issues include 
handler cuing, where even subconscious preconceptions on the part of the handler may 
bleed over to the dog.   Under current practices, training programs often incorporate blind 
search patterns, with the instructors opting not to tell the student handlers where the 
samples have been hidden, because otherwise experience has proven that the dog is likely 
to pick up on that expectation on the part of the handler, and alert.  One possible fix for 
this problem is to deliberately train the dogs by providing handlers with correct 
information in some searches, and misinformation in others, so that the dog learns that 
the handler’s cues are unreliable, and ignores them.  Every dog should also go through 
controlled negative testing, in which all objects or locations have no search items present.  
That way they learn that they do not always find something when they go to work. 
If we are really interested in protecting the public’s Fourth Amendment interests, 
we need to set state and federal standards for training dogs, rather than leaving them to 
the private sector.  The process of drafting standards will move that debate out of the 
courts, where they are enforced by the exclusionary rule, and into police standards 
 
148 See Richard Myers, “After Caballes, Should We Let Sniffing Dogs Lie?”  CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Winter, 
2005, at 4.  Dr. Lawrence Myers of Auburn University, a nationally-recognized expert on dog searches, 
suggests that searches be videotaped when possible to ensure that the result is reliable, because it is very 
easy to cue the dog to alert, and this is very easy to do subconsciously.  Even the best-intentioned officer 
may be telling his dog to alert without knowing it.  Having an unbiased witness in the form of the camera 
will help courts determine whether probable cause in fact existed.  And, for the prosecutor, in most cases it 
will also make a nice tool to demonstrate that the evidence was there, exactly where the dog said it would 
be.  Some handler cuing is so subtle that it may be difficult to detect, even on tape.  But the objective 
videotape will allow other experts an opportunity to critique the way the dog was used. 
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commissions and legislatures.  If the standards in use in the private sector are good,149 the 
agencies should adopt them formally as part of department policy, so the courts can make 
consistent – and uncontroversial – use of them.  And when dogs fail to meet those 
standards, the police should thank them for their service, award them a silver chew toy, 
and send them off to a happy retirement. 
B. Enforce the probable cause requirement, in light of the Bayesian 
analysis. 
While Justices Ginsburg and Souter failed to convince the majority as a matter of 
Fourth Amendment principles to require reasonable suspicion before bringing the dogs 
into play, they ultimately came closer than the majority did to the right result, albeit for 
other reasons.  Requiring reasonable suspicion coupled with the dog sniff – whether it is 
found before the sniff or after – is a simple and practical safeguard for ensuring the 
presence of probable cause before the search is conducted.  Officers clearly can support 
their instincts with articulable facts.  They do it all the time in the Terry-stop context, and 
it won’t be hard for prosecutors and judges to adapt those requirements to the dog sniff 
context.  
C. Move Standard-Setting Out of the Courts 
The final suggestion, moving the inquiry to the legislature or to a police 
commission, is more controversial.  There is always the possibility that the public choice 
limitations on legislative action will lead to worse standards, and that the floor set by the 
Fourth Amendment is the best we can do.  But assuming that the legislature or a police 
commission is interested in representing the more diffuse public interest, it might be able 
 
149 See supra, notes ___ and accompanying text. 
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to set training standards based on those circumstances that align the interests of the public 
and law enforcement.  Rather than getting the most search-endorsing dogs that pass 
constitutional muster, we could seek some optimal degree of accuracy that accommodates 
privacy and law enforcement interests. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Detector dogs are extremely useful tools, but to use them in a manner that 
respects the privacy concerns of all citizens, courts and counsel need to learn how they 
work, where they may have problems, and how those problems can be addressed.  While 
they aren’t flawless, a little diligence on the part of all parties will guarantee that the ones 
that remain in service are, indeed, good dogs.  Using them in a manner that comports 
with the probable cause requirement of Fourth Amendment requires an understanding of 
the limitations of even a very accurate scientific test in determining whether a relatively 
rare condition actually exists in an individual case in light of a positive test result.   A 
little judicious judicial application of Bayes Theorem will help the courts move away 
from widely held and intuitive misunderstandings and toward a better understanding of 
the real import of an alert by a well-trained dog.  
Whether or not one believes deploying a detector dog in a public space is a 
search, the standard the constitution requires before a search can begin is a warrant, 
issued on probable cause, or a good reason why the police don’t have one. The standard 
the courts have consistently adopted for the warrantless search of automobiles and other 
private containers is generally probable cause.   This article has demonstrated that an alert 
alone, even by a very accurate dog, does not constitute probable cause.  Whether the 
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courts would choose to once again water down the meaning of the probable cause 
standard in light of proper consideration of this information, or choose to adopt a “dog 
sniff plus additional indicia” requirement is impossible to predict.  The split on the Court 
in Caballes, even when the justices believed an alert to constitute probable cause, 
suggests that at least two justices will be open to beginning a new debate.  The systemic 
problems that arise in this context, “legal stickiness,” conflation of probable cause 
standards, collective action problems, and agency capture of standards, apply in other 
circumstances as well.  The lessons that the dogs can teach us can be applied to the 
movement to reevaluate the accuracy of fingerprints, eyewitness identifications, law 
enforcement profiles, and many other as yet unexplored examples of old technology.  Just 
because the Fourth Amendment is an imprecise tool for updating the way we use old 
technology does not mean that we should concede that the problem is insoluble.  The 
courts may yet have something to say, if judges are willing to look past precedent with 
fresh eyes to incorporate new information and update their understanding of old 
technology.   
